Download ii. el estatuto legal del islam en europa

Director:
Isidoro Martín Sánchez (Madrid)
Consejo de Redacción:
Iván C. Ibán (Madrid)
Agustín Motilla (Madrid)
Marco Ventura (Siena)
Charalambos Papastahis (Salónica)
Secretario:
Marcos González (Madrid)
Vol. I, 2006
ÍNDICE
“El Islam en Europa”
(Coordinador Agustín Motilla)
Presentación (I.Martín Sánchez, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid) ........................... 5
Prólogo del coordinador (A. Motilla, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid) ..................... 9
I.
Islam y terrorismo
1. Religion and Security in Europe after September 11 (R. Mazzola, Universidad del Piamonte Orientale) ................................................................. 13
2. The Reaction to Islamic Terrorism and the Implications for Religious
Freedom After September 11: A United States Perspective (W.C.
Durham, Universidad Brigham Young-B. D. Liggett, Universidad
Brigham Young)........................................................................................... 41
3. Tras el 11-M: presente y futuro del proceso de institucionalización del
Islam en España (I. Jiménez-Aybar, Universidad de Zaragoza) .................. 67
II.
El estatuto legal del Islam en Europa
1. Islam and the European System of Church-State Relations: a (False)
Problem? (S. Ferrari, Universidad de Milán) ............................................... 87
2. La representación del Islam en Francia: retos y perspectivas (A. Garay, Universidad de Aix-Marseille III) ....................................................... 116
3. The Legal Status of Islam in Great Britain (J. Rivers, Universidad de
Bristol) ........................................................................................................ 144
4. El status legal del Islam en España (J. Mantecón, Universidad de Cantabria).......................................................................................................... 165
III.
El Derecho de familia islámico y su reconocimiento en el Derecho
europeo
1. Polygamy in Europe (R. Aluffi Beck-Peccoz, Universidad de Turín)............... 209
2. Repudio islámico y la modernización del Derecho en el mundo islámico (Z. Combalia, Universidad de Zaragoza).............................................. 223
3. Mujer árabe, cambio social e identidad islámica (C. Pérez Beltrán,
Universidad de Granada) ............................................................................ 239
IV.
El problema del velo islámico en la escuela
1. Opinión pública francesa y el velo islámico (B. Chelín-Pont, Universidad de Aix-Marsella III) ............................................................................. 263
2. The Islamic Headscarf in Germany (G. Robbers, Universidad de Trier)........ 285
3. Muslim dress in English Law: Lifting the veil on Human Rights (M.
Hill, Universidad de Cardiff-R. Sandberg, Universidad de Cardiff) .......... 302
La Fundación Universitaria Española y la dirección de la Revista no se responsabilizan de las opiniones mantenidas por los autores en sus artículos.
Administración, Venta, Distribución y Suscripciones:
Fundación Universitaria Española.
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Teléfono: 91 431 11 22– Fax: 91 576 73 52.
E-mail: [email protected]
ISSN: 1887-3243
Depósito Legal: M- 2.874 - 2007
Presentación
P
arece en cierto modo obligado, o al menos usual, al presentar una nueva revista
científica justificar las razones de su aparición. En efecto, no cabe duda de que
ante un evento de esta naturaleza surge espontáneamente la pregunta de cuál es el
sentido y la finalidad de otra publicación periódica más en el ya nutrido sector editorial
dedicado al estudio jurídico del factor religioso civilmente relevante.
Bastaría, a este respecto, alegar simplemente como justificación de su existencia que
el incremento de revistas especializadas siempre es un dato positivo, porque constituye un
índice de vitalidad científica y de importancia de la materia objeto de estudio.
Para corroborar esta respuesta, es suficiente observar como en el actual mundo globalizado nos encontramos paradójicamente –junto a un incremento de la secularización,
especialmente visible en la Europa occidental– ante un resurgimiento de la presencia del
elemento religioso en la sociedad. Este resurgimiento ha adoptado diversas formas y matices según las condiciones políticas y sociales existentes en cada Estado. En este sentido,
y a modo de ejemplo, no cabe olvidar el papel decisivo desempeñado por la religión en la
caída de los regímenes comunistas de la Europa del Este –y el consiguiente reforzamiento
de la posición de la Iglesia Ortodoxa en ellos y particularmente en Rusia–, el auge de las
iglesias evangélicas en Latinoamérica y la espectacular emergencia del Islam en lugares
en los que era hasta hace poco tiempo una creencia con escaso número de adherentes.
Todo hacía presagiar que el postmodernismo y las filosofías de la crisis, como el existencialismo y el nihilismo, harían realidad las profecías sobre el fin de la religión –
enunciadas, entre otros, por Marx y Nietzche– y su sustitución por la ciencia y la industrialización. Sin embargo, la realidad ha desmentido estos presagios y la nueva revitalización de la religión parece empeñada en querer demostrar que la historia del progreso de la
humanidad no sigue un camino rectilíneo sino más bien cíclico acorde con la teoría de los
corsi y ricorsi formulada por Vico.
Además, esta efervescencia del fenómeno religioso ha producido profundos cambios
sociales. En concreto, ha supuesto una nueva configuración de Europa como sociedad
multicultural. Ello ha obedecido fundamentalmente a la presencia –dentro de la continua
corriente migratoria que se viene produciendo en gran parte de los Estados integrantes de
la Unión Europea– de grupos sobre todo de religión musulmana, caracterizados culturalmente por una concepción de las relaciones entre la política y la religión esencialmente
distinta a la del mundo occidental de raíces cristianas. Este tipo de grupos ha dado lugar a
la transformación de una sociedad europea pluralista –en la que diversos sujetos compar-
6
ISIDORO MARTÍN SÁNCHEZ
tían un conjunto de valores comúnmente aceptados y donde la religión no era motivo de
enfrentamientos sociales– en otra multicultural. Es decir, en una sociedad en la cual los
nuevos sujetos consideran que su identidad cultural y, especialmente, religiosa no es negociable y en la que, incluso, se niegan a aceptar las reglas del juego político.
Desde otro punto de vista, la revitalización de la religión ha hecho surgir una amplia
polémica sobre el significado de la laicidad del Estado en diferentes países –Francia, Italia, Alemania y España– la cual en último término es una muestra evidente de la relevancia del factor religioso en la esfera pública y de los diversos problemas –entre ellos, jurídicos– que puede plantear.
En los comienzos del siglo XXI, lejos de presenciar el fin de las religiones, nos encontramos ante un auge de éstas. Auge que, si puede originar una renovación espiritual, también puede ser fuente de intensos conflictos sociales en el caso de las religiones degeneren –como por desgracia ha sucedido en varias ocasiones– en fundamentalismos. En
cualquier caso, parecen confirmarse las palabras de Malraux según las cuales “el siglo
XXI será espiritual o no será”.
La religión, es por tanto, un elemento social de palpitante actualidad y en plena ebullición. De aquí que el estudio de su relevancia jurídica en la sociedad civil justifique sobradamente la existencia de una revista más entre la pluralidad de publicaciones periódicas
especializadas.
No obstante, siendo evidente esta realidad, una nueva revista debe aportar lógicamente
a este estudio alguna cosa más que las ya existentes o, por lo menos, algo diferente.
De acuerdo con estas premisas, la revista Derecho y Religión, cuyo nombre ya indica
un contenido más amplio que el constituido por la mera problemática de las relaciones
entre el Estado y las confesiones, abordará el estudio de los diversos aspectos del factor
religioso jurídicamente relevantes en los ordenamientos estatales.
Cada número tendrá carácter monográfico, lo cual implica el estudio sistemático de un
tema concreto. Con ello se pretende combinar la periodicidad propia de una revista con la
utilidad de un volumen, que contenga la suficiente información para el estudio de una
determinada cuestión. En este sentido, la revista Derecho y Religión adopta una metodología diferente de la usualmente empleada en las publicaciones periódicas especializadas,
las cuales incluyen en cada número diversos artículos sobre un amplio espectro de temas.
Por otra parte, la revista Derecho y Religión no se ocupará de las habituales secciones
sobre reseña bibliográfica e información legislativa y jurisprudencial, que se encuentran
en otras publicaciones. En relación con este punto, creemos que las materias cubiertas por
estas secciones pueden ser fácilmente localizadas a través de los actuales medios informáticos, no siendo por tanto imperativa su inclusión en una revista. Ello no obsta para que
en cada número pueda hacerse una breve mención de la legislación, jurisprudencia y bibliografía referentes al tema tratado si, a juicio de cada autor, se estima conveniente.
La revista que hoy presentamos sólo publicará artículos redactados en español e inglés. La elección del español obedece a razones obvias: la revista ha nacido en España y
PRESENTACIÓN
7
sus fundadores son españoles. Aparte de ello, aspira a su difusión en el ámbito latinoamericano constituido, en su inmensa mayoría, por países hispanoparlantes.
La razón del empleo del inglés se debe a que, hoy en día, es el idioma científico por
excelencia y sin duda el de más amplia difusión internacional.
La periodicidad de la revista será anual sin perjuicio de que, si más adelante cumple
los objetivos de éxito deseados, pueda publicarse con una cadencia temporal más breve.
La revista no nace con la pretensión de defender una línea religiosa, ideológica o política determinada. Por tanto, acogerá las diversas teorías y opiniones de quienes participen
en ella sin más límites que los impuestos por la seriedad y el rigor científico.
La organización administrativa de la revista está compuesta por un Director, un Consejo de Redacción y una Secretaría. Cada número será encomendado a una persona que
asumirá la tarea de coordinarlo y elegirá a los autores que vayan a participar en él, bajo la
supervisión y aprobación del Director y el Consejo de Redacción. El coordinador de cada
número pasará a formar parte de este órgano.
La Secretaría de la revista estará, en todo caso, a cargo de un profesor del Área de Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid.
La edición de la revista es asumida por la Fundación Universitaria Española a la que,
desde estas líneas, deseamos expresar nuestro agradecimiento por su inestimable e incondicional colaboración.
Esta es, en síntesis, la andadura iniciada por un grupo de profesores universitarios con
la esperanza e ilusión que toda nueva empresa conlleva y con el deseo de lograr su aceptación por parte de la comunidad científica. Su consecución constituirá la confirmación
más inequívoca de que hemos acertado en nuestro propósito.
ISIDORO MARTÍN SÁNCHEZ
Prólogo del coordinador
H
oy en día en Europa se tiende a considerar al mundo islámico, entendido éste por
el conjunto de países y poblaciones que comparten, desde su expansión a partir
del siglo VII, una cultura común, la cultura islámica, como algo ajeno o extraño
al ámbito europeo. Ello supone ignorar siglos de interrelación, de influencia mutua, donde
hubo épocas en la que la filosofía, la medicina, el arte islámico dejaron una huella profunda en nuestra cultura, especialmente entre las naciones de la Europa mediterránea.
Hubo un tiempo en el que el grado de civilización, si por ello entendemos la altura y refinamiento intelectual y artístico, era muy superior entre los Reinos taifas de Al-Andalus
que en los rudos y guerreros Reinos cristianos del norte. El poeta judío del siglo XI Mosé
Ibn Ezra se lamentaba al dejar Granada y el conjunto de bibliotecas y de sabios con los
que se había rodeado la dinastía ziri, al tener que emigrar a la oscura España cristiana,
donde “no le llegan más voces que el plañir de chacales y el graznar de los pájaros”, le
rodean “ciencias balbucientes y lenguas tartamudas”, “salvajes ávidos de una brizna de
ciencia, sedientos de las aguas de la fe”, y se pregunta “¿qué ha de hacer una lengua de
elocuencia en un país de mudos?” .
Bien es verdad que la población musulmana europea la constituyen fundamentalmente
inmigrantes en busca de trabajo. Ya por su número – se calcula que hay en Europa cerca
de veinte millones de musulmanes –, por los extraños que pueden parecer sus usos culturales y religiosos, o por los acontecimientos de ámbito internacional, son vistos con recelo
por amplios sectores de la sociedad. A ello contribuyen los estereotipos del Islam divulgados por los medios de comunicación; un ejército de intransigentes que, aprovechándose
de las ventajas de la sociedad tecnificada y proteccionista europea, pretenden imponer su
visión del mundo teocrática e intolerante, su discriminación de la mujer y, en definitiva,
una cultura y una religión fanática, a la sociedad libre e igualitaria construida con tanto
esfuerzo. Su presencia en las ciudades, a través de la visualización de símbolos como los
minaretes en los núcleos urbanos, el pañuelo o hijab de las mujeres, o la proliferación de
tiendas que venden alimentos halal en sus barrios, supone, para este sector social, el
avance de la marea musulmana.
No se pretende desconocer las importantes diferencias que median entre el Islam y el
mundo occidental, fundadas en gran medida en la relevancia de la religión en una y otra
cultura. Frente a la sociedad secularizada europea, gobernada por un Estado neutral frente
a las creencias de los ciudadanos, la religión islámica, que asumen la mayor parte de los
Estados de mayoría musulmana, supone un modo de vida y posee una vocación totaliza-
10
AGUSTÍN MOTILLA
dora en la explicación del mundo, la sociedad y el hombre. Especialmente intensos son
los imperativos religiosos en el ámbito de la política. Las naciones islámicas no han pasado por la secularización de las instituciones públicas; nunca ha existido una organización
espiritual separada del poder secular, y éste siempre ha asumido el papel tanto de dirección de la comunidad civil como de la comunidad de creyentes – la umma –, que se identifican en los mismos ciudadanos-fieles. Es natural que los musulmanes europeos compartan esta visión integral ínsita a sus raíces culturales. Pero de ahí a afirmar su pretensión de imponer su concepción, o defender la incompatibilidad en todo caso de los colectivos musulmanes, sus intereses y acciones, con los principios de laicidad, pluralismo e
igualdad pilares del orden jurídico europeo supone, a mi juicio, un desconocimiento –
muchas veces intencionado – de la realidad.
La realidad social europea nos presenta, al igual que sucede en los países islámicos, un
Islam plural, dividido en ideologías, etnias y nacionalidades, con igual – o mayor – intensidad que en otras grandes religiones. Es cierto que desde mediados del siglo XX han
cobrado auge movimientos fundamentalistas –en parte por los fracasos de los partidos
laicos en el gobierno de las naciones–, intensificando la concepción integradora de política y religión. Y que se han vivido dramáticos episodios de terrorismo provocados por
grupos que dicen actuar por motivos religiosos, actualizando el concepto de guerra santa
o yihad.
Sin embargo, estos datos no pueden ocultar las obras del Islam tolerante, que pretende
adaptar su cultura y religión a los tiempos actuales, y el hecho de que la mayoría de los
musulmanes se declaran contrarios a la violencia. En realidad, los musulmanes en Europa
se muestran en su conjunto más preocupados por la solución de los problemas inmediatos, es decir, de aquellos que afectan a su vida cotidiana. Los cuales dependen del tiempo
que lleven asentados en el país las comunidades islámicas. En una primera fase de inmigración individual y masculina los problemas serán de índole económica y laboral; si bien
en una segunda fase, con la reunificación familiar tras la inmigración de la esposa y los
hijos, se añadirán los que se derivan del mantenimiento de su identidad cultural y religiosa. Aspectos tales como el respeto a las costumbres, la enseñanza religiosa de sus hijos en
la escuela, la construcción de mezquitas o lugares de oración, la observancia de sus festividades, la adquisición de alimentos halal, etc., saltan a un primer plano en la reivindicaciones de las comunidades islámicas consolidadas en el seno de los Estados europeos.
Según lo dicho, más que rechazar de plano la compatibilidad de los musulmanes y del
Islam frente a los valores europeos en función de una hipotética contradicción absoluta
entre los principios en que se asientan el Islam y los Estados europeos, postura maximalista producto del estereotipo sobre el Islam del que ya hablamos, resulta más útil el estudio sosegado de los problemas que actuaciones, instituciones o comportamientos singulares de los musulmanes que puedan violentar principios o valores intangibles del Derecho
europeo. Se parte de la base, claro está, que uno de esos principios-guía de los ordenamientos de los Estados es la tutela de la libertad religiosa, lo cual otorgaría, de entrada,
PRÓLOGO DEL COORDINADOR
11
plena legitimidad a los musulmanes para realizar aquellos actos que no contradicen los
valores del orden público nacional.
A pesar de la distinta naturaleza de los conflictos que presentan los colectivos musulmanes en la sociedad europea dependiendo, como hemos dicho, del arraigo en el país y de
la consolidación plena del núcleo familiar, lo cual marca diferencias entre Estados que
hoy reciben la primera generación de inmigrantes –como Italia o España– de otros que
poseen la experiencia de segundas, terceras o incluso cuartas generaciones de musulmanes en su territorio, los problemas que plantea la convivencia con la cultura islámica son
–y serán– similares. De ahí el interés del tratamiento comparativo entre distintos Estados
de la Unión Europea que se utiliza en el presente volumen.
---------------------------------------
T
his volume 1 of “Derecho y Religion” (Law and Religion) at hand, devoted to
“Islam in Europe” represents a contribution, from the study and rational systemization of the problems, to the description of some conflictive aspects in the relations between countries and their Islamic minorities, as well as to opening the way for
solutions which could best contribute to peaceful integration within European society.
The thematic proposal of the authors, renowned experts in matters regarding the social
and legal relevance of religion in contemporary society, deals with four issues of unquestionable timeliness, which permit a detailed analysis of the attitude of governments that
are facing the challenge represented by integration of and co-existence with a Muslim
minority.
The first issue deals with the bloody terrorist acts that were carried out by Islamic
groups in the United States and Europe, and how said events have altered the concept of
security as limiting religious freedom, particularly in reference to the Muslim community.
The recent enactment of antiterrorist laws which likewise affect groups with a religious
ideology, are an example of the timeliness of the problems presented. The recounting of
the North American experience can not be excluded; given its value as a precedent for
many other countries in Europe.
The second group of articles offers an overview of the problems of Islam in Europe, in
addition to focusing on certain countries in particular. Concerns of the Islamic communities such as construction of places of worship, the observance of religious holidays, dietary restrictions, the teaching of Islam in schools, and finally, the carrying out of religious
worship in prisons and hospitals, are dealt with from the legal perspective. Noteworthy
among these problems is the representation of persons who profess the Muslim faith,
related to the consequences of one of features of European Islam – projection, at the same
time, of the situation of Islam at the international level–: the plurality of groups, ideologies, ethnicities, and nationalities that make up Islam. This factor greatly hinders understanding in legitimately obtaining representative bodies before public powers in different
12
AGUSTÍN MOTILLA
countries. The exposition regarding the situation of Islamic groups in some European
countries and the problems of leadership which have even obliged public authorities to
intervene in search of democratically elected representatives, are the themes of interest in
the published articles.
The volume closes with two groups of articles with a common thread: paths for integrating Islamic law into European law. The first is Islamic family law, and in particular
matrimonial law within the categories of private international law and the relegation of
the internal law code to national law. Institutions of Islamic matrimony in contrast with
principles of values of European legal system such as the rights of polygamous marriage
or unilateral repudiation by the husband are studied as indicators of the conflict that could
arise in the process of recognising the institutions originating in the precepts of the
Sharia. These two institutions highlight the patriarchal nature and the predominance of
the male over the female which inspire Islamic law. One of the articles focuses precisely
on the study of women in the Arab world.
The second thematic group– the fourth and last of the volume– has as its aim one of
the cultural and religious manifestations of Islamic women which has caused a veritable
social war in certain countries: the Islamic veil. The symbol of Islam fanaticism for some,
and for others, a mere manifestation of Islamic cultural identity or that of the profession
of faith of a minority that feels pushed aside, the problem of the headscarf or the Islamic
hijab has, especially in France, became a theme of constant debate which has even warranted the attention of lawmakers. The comparative study of the events in that country
and in others countries of the European Union will serve to analyse different approaches
to the same issue.
Hence, the search for mechanisms which guarantee free profession of the Islamic faith
and respect for its cultural identity, together with the protection of the fundamental values
in which European society is based, translate into a challenge for a European Law which
has to be applied in a multicultural society. Only through the necessary making more
flexible of the legal institutions allowing for the incorporation of new assumptions, and
the adaptation of the Muslim minority to the basic principles of social and legal order, can
the basic integration of the Muslim minority be correctly channelled, avoiding the tensions, and even the violence that has occurred in some countries.
AGUSTÍN MOTILLA
I. ISLAM Y TERRORISMO
Religion and Security in Europe after September 11
ROBERTO MAZZOLA
Universidad del Piamonte Oriental
1. SOME PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE PRESUMED
DANGEROUSNESS OF ISLAM
A
fter the events in New York, Madrid and London, one is entitled to ask whether
Islam is a real threat to Europe. Is it reasonable to assert that since the 11th of
September1 the threat of Islamic terrorism has constituted a veritable danger in
ethical, ideological and political terms?2 Is our state of security so greatly impaired that
we are no longer in a position to understand the viewpoints of others and claim that we
are clear-headed in the face of danger and fear?3
What is to be done? Should we approach Islam with understanding or remain on our
guard in a attitude of suspicion and grave concern?4 Is the presence of Islam in Europe an
“emergenza” justifying the resort to political and legislative solutions proper to the “protected democracies”?5
As is well known, Europe's legal systems envisage different steps for the handling of
both institutional and political emergencies. However, if the British6 or the majority7
1
Cf. N. Chomsky, It. trans. 11 settembre. Le ragioni di chi?, Milan, Marco-Tropea Editore, 2001, esp. pp.
11-21. See also T. Padoa Schioppa, Dodici settembre. Il mondo non è al punto zero, Milan, Rizzoli, 2002, pp.
19-25.
2
Cf. S. Dambruoso, Prefazione all'edizione italiana di “Combattere il terrorismo. Norme e proposte del
Consiglio d'Europa”, Roma, Sapere 2000, Edizioni Multimediali, 2005, p. 7.
3
Cf. A. Koestler, It. trans, Ladri nella notte, Milan, Mondadori 1971, p. 170.
4
Cf. O. Fallaci, La rabbia e l'orgoglio, Milan, Rizzoli, 2004, p. 79. From the theological standpoint
equally strong criticism of the Islamic community has been expressed by G. Baget Bozzo, L'Islam è totalizzante, in the “Regno-att”, 22 (2001), p. 731.
5
Cf. C. Bonini- G. D'Avanzo, Il mercato della paura. La guerra al terrorismo islamico nel grande inganno italiano, Turin, Einaudi, pp. 335-336.
6
The substantial feature of the British system is a preference for the Government to act de facto to defend
public security in the execution of its duty to avoid the destruction of the State and then be judged by Parliament with regard to its political responsibility. “For this reason”, says P. Bonetti, Terrorismo, emergenza e
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ROBERTO MAZZOLA
model is involved, or if it is decided to resort to a state of war and the extensive use of
emergency orders8, the common denominator of a state of emergency always presupposes
the insufficiency of the juridical rules in force. They prove incapable of remedying serious injuries or risks of injury caused to the fundamental principles of the legal system.
With this in mind, art. 16 of the French Constitution founds the conferment of exceptional
powers on the President of the Republic on the existence of a “grave” and “immediate”
threat to the “institutions de la République, l'indépendance de la Nation, l'intégrité de son
territoire ou l'exécution de ses engagements internationaux” such as to interrupt “le fonctionnement régulier des pouvoirs publics constitutionnels”.
Through the estado d'excepción and the estado de sitio embodied in art 116, 1st para.
of the Spanish Constitution9, the legislator refers to a situation of grave functional disturbance of the democratic institutions and public services essential for the community. A
solution also adopted by the draftsmen of the German Constitution in the form of
Verteidigungsfall (state of defence) or Spannungsfall (state of tension). These situations,
according to art. 1151 of the GG10, can only be declared when the federal territory is the
subject of armed aggression or there are serious threats to the liberal-democratic order of
the Federation or a Land.
The various regulations thus described illustrate the need for the occurrence of two
specific conditions as the premises of a “stato di emergenza”11 and a serious, widespread
principi fondamentali in Quad. del “Gruppo di Pisa”, Giurisprudenza costituzionale e principi fondamentali.
Alla riceraa del nucleo duro delle costitutioni, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the “Gruppo di Pisa”, S.
Staiano (ed.), Turin, Giappichelli, 206, p. 202, “whenever in the event of urgent necessity the Government
has adopted that violate a law in fulfilment of its duty to defend the State, Parliament may support the political responsibility of the Cabinet or approve an Act of Indemnity to cover the provisions adopted by the Government contrary to the law, these being often violations of the Habeas Corpus Act”.
suspension of the constitution itself in cases where it is not possible to remedy exceptional events by
means of the ordinary legislative means, or the more or less time-limited introduction of states of exception
with respect to the constitutional rules. This model accepts the principle of “necessity” as a source of law. Cf.
S. Romano, Sui decreti-legge e lo stato di assedio in occasione del terremoto di Messina e di Reggio
Calabria (1909) in Lesser works, Milan, Giuffré, 1950, p. 371.
7
In this model, provision is made within the norms of a constitution for the derogation or even the total or
partial In this model, provision is made within the norms of a constitution for the derogation or even the total
or partial suspension of the constitution itself in cases where it is not possible to remedy exceptional events
by means of the ordinary legislative means, or the more or less time-limited introduction of states of exception with respect to the constitutional rules. This model accepts the principle of “necessity” as a source of
law. Cf. S. Romano, Sui i decreti-legge e lo stato di assedio in occasione del terremoto di Messina e di Reggio Calabria (1909) in Lesser works, Milan, Giuffré, 1950, p. 371.
8
The Italian Constitution, for example, makes provision for the “State of war” in art. 87.
9
Art. 116 “Una ley orgánica regulerá los estados de alarma, de excepión y de sitio, y las competencias y
limitaciones correspondientes”.
10
Art. 115l “Der Bundestag kann mit Zustimmung des Bundersrates jederzeit durch einen vom
Bundespräten zu verkündenden Beschulß den Verteidigungsfall für beendet erklären. Der Bundesrat kann
verlangen, dass de Bundestag hierüber beschiließt. Der Verteidigungsfall ist unverzüglich für beendet zu
erklären, wenn die Voraussetzungen für seine Festsellung nicht mehr gegeben sind”.
11
Cf. V. Angiolini, Necessity and emergency in public law, CEDAM, Padua, 1986. See also S. Ferrari,
Libertà religiosa e sicurezza nazionale in Europa dopo l'11 settembre, in Quad. dir. pol. eccl, 1, (2005), p.
163 et seq.
RELIGION AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
15
danger to the political community: a) the threat must have as its object the constitutional
order12; b) the ordinary regulatory measures must be unable to cope with the institutional
emergency.
Our initial questions, therefore, can be reformulated in a single question: has Islam,
since 11 September 2001, constituted a threat to European constitutional democracies,
social peace and national security?
2. ISLAM AND DEMOCRATIC-CONSTITUTIONAL COMPATIBILITY. A TENTATIVE
CLASSIFICATION
Our single question cannot be answered without an initial clarification of the several
façons d'être of Islam in Europe as determined by its different levels of integration with
the democratic-constitutional system.
One must thus assess, in sociological terms, the levels of integration of its believers in
civil society, and also, in juridical terms, the degree of institutional loyalty deducible
from their inclination to accept consensual regulation, from formal declarations of loyalty
to constitutional values, from their greater or lesser readiness to seek an evolutive interpretation of the sharia and, of equal significance, the presence or otherwise of representatives of the principal Muslim organisations and communities in consultative bodies appointed by the government13.
This set of parameters can be used to draw a distinction in terms of organisation and
behaviour between four forms of Islam: “moderato-liberale”, “moderato-tradizionalista”
and the two fundamentalist currents, namely “salafita-jihadista” Islam and “salafitashaykhista” Islam.
The first two forms do not pose a problem as far as natural security and public order
are concerned, since the moderate Islamic world is that “enlightened, inspired with the
ideas of dialogue and tolerance, open to the world of today”, whereas greater concerns are
raised by the fundamentalist organisations as the expression of a radical Islam. Hasty
analyses and conclusions, however, have ended up by describing the situation in what are
often very approximate terms. By no means few, indeed, are those who identify fundamentalism with violent extremism and refuse to recognise any distinction between militants, whose action can be expressed without resort to violence, and terrorists14. The logic
of “violence”, while present in the practice of religious radicalism, not only Islamic, is
not, however, inevitable. In reality, fundamentalists mainly seek to protect and strengthen
12
Interpretation confirmed by the European Human Rights Court in Lawless vs. Ireland, 1 July 1961, req.
332/57. The Court recognized the existence of a condition of emergency when a threat concerns “la vie
organisée de la population et constitue une menace pour la vie organisée de la communauté composant
13
l'État”.
F. Sabati, Islam: l'identità inquieta dell'Europa. Viaggio tra i musulmani d'Occidente. Forward by F.
De Bortoli, Il Saggiatore, Milan, 2006, p. 40.
14
Cf. G.A. Almond - R. Scott Appleby - E. Sivan, It. trans., Religioni forti. L'avanzata dei
fondamentalismi sulla scena mondiale, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2006, p. 24.
ROBERTO MAZZOLA
16
their own identity by promoting a strong presence of the religious in society and strong
competition with other religious movements and secular institutions and philosophies.
Nothing, however, “in this basic aim, implies that fundamentalisms infringe the fundamental rules of the pluralist societies”15.
Strenuous opposition towards the liberal democratic and secular State, on the other,
constitutes a character common to all religious radicalism, including that of Islam. Islamism, in fact, shares with the other religious fundamentalisms hostility towards political
cultures that deny religion a central role in the ordering of society. This defence to the
utterance of the centrality of religion on the political and social plane is, in other terms,
the sine qua non of radicalism. A movement that lacks cannot be properly described as
“radical”16. This dualist vision obviously clashes with the contractualistic and mediatory
categories proper to pluralist societies. Islamic fundamentalism, indeed, accords no room
at for the point of view of the other side. Steeped in the conviction that their cause alone
is just, Islamists readily believe that any action, even a barbarous crime, is justified, since
they know they are in the right, “not only politically, but also morally”17.
Yet despite the strength of these common traits, Islamic fundamentalism cannot be
summed up as a single orthopraxy.
A distinction must be drawn between a “salafita-jihadista” Islam and “salafitashaykhista” Islam, which is characterised by an enclave culture foreign to the use of
violence.
In the first case, the organisations that interpret salafismo in such radical forms are
wedded to a model founded on the strong dualism between secularity and religion, and
managed and fuelled by a strong, authoritarian leadership which controls cadres or
militant cells through a rigorous theological system that justifies the strategy of violence.
This type of Islamism mainly arises and grows as a reaction to that part of the umma
which has allowed itself to be seduced by modern culture. “The followers of salafismo
have no fellow feelings for either the Muslim Brothers or the Tabligh, that is to say the
largest pietistic and missionary movement, which they accuse of reprehensible
innovation”18.
This means that when salafismo-jihadista gins to operate within a liberal democratic
system it camouflages itself and adopts a low profile as far as its social and religious
claims are concerned. Resistance to secularisation and marginalisation of the religious is
not the main aim of this strategy. On the contrary, it exploits the ample guarantees of
15
Ibid. p. 28.
Ibid p. 134. See also O. El Ghazaly Harb, The test bench of democracy, in Internazionale, No. 527
(2006), p. 86.
17
J. Stern, It. trans., Terrore nel nome di Dio. Perché i militanti religiosi uccidono, Luiss University
Press, Rome, 2005, p. 456. See also R. Armstrong, It. trans., In nome di Dio. Il fondamentalismo per ebrei,
cristiani e musulmani, Milan, Il Saggiatore, 2002; M. Juergensmeyer, It. trans., Terroristi in nome di Dio,
Rome-Bari, Laterza, 2003.
18
F. Sabati, op. cit. p. 44.
16
RELIGION AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
17
freedom offered by the State to carve out a social space for itself and capitalise cultural
and organisations resources. The true objective of this form of fundamentalism, in fact, is
not the Western democracies, but the governments of the Islamic world guilty of failing
to apply the laws of the Koran. It is the world governed by disbelievers (kuffar) who have
decided in favour of or authorised the massive introduction of laws foreign to the sharia
and irreligious teachings that constitutes the true target of salafismo-jihadista.
It thus abstains from any form of agreement with the country's institutions and every
form of democratic participation in public life. Instead, it proceeds from a dialectic and
conflictual interpretation of history and politics. Conflict, which justifies the use of violence, is seen as the only way of bringing about Islamic order19. This conception, moreover, is fuelled by clear public law categories founded on the absence of any duty of loyalty to the State. The legal-political pattern of the mahadi, which justifies disobedience to
a ruler, is the bedrock of jihadista fundamentalist reasoning. It does not accept any form
of loyalty to a State whose constitution is alien to religious law. There can thus be no
doubt that when authority is culpable one must break away from it, since obedience to
those who set themselves up against the Creator cannot exist20. The consequences of this
approach are apparent both in politics and international law. There is nothing outside the
confines of Islam apart from the dar al harb, the world at war with which the Muslim
community cannot have any relationships on equal terms. This interpretation of the jihad,
therefore, justifies armed action in view of both the expansion of Islam and its defence. It
seems clear that a state of peace with the non-Muslim nations cannot only be temporary
and that no true agreement can be reached if this seems useful for Islam.
The goals of salafismo-shaykhista are of a very different colour. This facet of radical
Islamism is explicitly non-violent and inclined to religious dutifulness. The Tabligh of the
1980s and the non-jihadist salifisti are now the most significant examples of this form of
fundamentalism. Their common trait is strict preservation of the religious tradition
through the application of an orthopraxy carried to extremes as a means of formalizating,
through signs and forms of behaviour, their detachment from and refusal of the society
around them. The leitmotiv of this dualism, however, is not conquest, but isolation. At the
centre of the community project is the need to steer clear of the corruption that inevitably
stems from mixing with outsiders. The true objective of this closed-in radicalism, therefore, is not to change the world outside, but to maintain the integrity of the community.
Hence its obsession with strictness and the need for purity. This political action of this
enclave is inspired by the elimination of every innovation (bid'a) and the struggle against
every slackening of morals (fasad). Hence the attention devoted to study of the Holy
Writings and the diffusion of endogamy as the main ways of preserving the integrity of
19
Cf. A. Palma, Terrorismo internazionale: risposta dello Stato italiano, in <www.studioperlapace.it>,
(visited on 18.4.06).
20
Cf. B. Etienne, It. trans. L'islamismo radicale, Milan, Rizzoli, 2001, p. 80.
ROBERTO MAZZOLA
18
the enclave21. The rate of institutional compatibility in this case is low, but does not turn
into open hostility. A defensive strategy entirely confined within the community, in fact,
reduces the possibility of friction with the institutions and civil society. A fundamentalism of this kind interacts with its counterpart in the State, but mainly for the purpose of
obtaining privileges to safeguard its identity22 through sectorial agreements that none the
less preclude forms of stabile collaboration with consultative bodies appointed by the
government. Association of Islam with security thus seems to be restricted to jihadista
fundamentalism23. Yet we must ask ourselves whether this is really true. Are we sure that
Islamic terrorism really constitutes a threat to democratic institutions sufficient to justify
the suspension of a whole series of fundamental rights and freedoms? Three issues must
first be made clear prior to any attempt to find answers to these questions: a) what are we
to consider as terrorism; b) what is the relationship between terrorism and subversion; c)
is Islamic terrorism always by its very nature subversive?
3. IS ISLAMIC TERRORISM SUBVERSIVE?
3.1 Question (a). The constituent features of the criminal activity known as
“international terrorism”
Faced with the repeated occurrence of terroristic acts based on religious motives,
international, Community and domestic law has felt the need to reach a consensus on the
meaning of terrorism in order to make its interdiction by the police quicker and more
effective. A search for formal uniformity pursued through the identification of certain
constant features in the many facets of “terror”: a) collective fear and intimidation
directed to persons and institutions; b) violation of fundamental individual and collective
rights; c) destabilisation of essential political structures; d) criminalisation of indirect
activities designed of favour terroristic acts; e) criminalisation of terroristic activities
against other States.
The result is a complicated set of circumstances with substantial consequences for the
interests of the community. A key factor in the aims of terrorism is its psychological effects. Violence in itself, in fact, is not the characteristic feature of terrorism. What counts
is violence capable of generating “fear” and “terror” in a community. This notion was
already envisaged in the Convention for the prevention and repression of terrorism
adopted at Geneva in 1937. An approach that has been carried over into the most recent
21
Ibid., p. 69.
“Radical Shiites regard the outside world as founded on istikbar, a Koranic notion that originally
indicated 'all those who, swollen with pride, refused to accept the Koran'. The term is often ironically coupled
with 'slaves of imperialism (isti 'mar). The Sunnites prefer a modern term ghatrasa or arrogance, or refusal of
the sovereignty (hakimiyya) of Allah, which replaces His laws with those made by men”, G.A. Almond - R.
Scott Appleby - E. Sivan, op. cit., p. 56.
23
Cf. G. Kepel, It. trans Jihad. Ascesa e declino. Storia di fondamentalismo islamico, Rome, Carocci,
2005.
22
RELIGION AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
19
sources of international and Community law. Section 5 of Recommendation No. 1426 of
the Council of Europe (23 September 1999) entitled “European democracies in the face
of terrorism”, in fact, defines terrorism as “any offence committed by individuals of
groups that resort to violence or threaten violence against a country, its institutions, its
population in general or natural persons, who, motivated by separatist aspirations, extremist ideological concepts or fanaticism, or driven by irrational or subjective urges, aim
to submit the public powers, certain individuals or groups of society or more in general
public opinion to an atmosphere of terror”.
Yet there is more to terrorism than fear alone. It bites deep into fundamental human
rights. In its Resolution No. 54 of 17 December 1999, entitled “Human rights and
terrorism”, the General Assembly of the Council of Europe stated that terrorist acts are
capable of “[…] cancelling human rights (and) fundamental freedoms […]” through
attempts to kill or furthermore, through the limitation of personal freedom by means of
kidnapping or the taking of hostages.
In addition to causing fear and violating fundamental rights, terrorist groups often
pursue more specifically political objectives, such as the institutional destabilisation of an
order or an economic system. In its “common position” (27 December 2001) relating to
the application of specific rules in the fight against terrorism, the Council of Europe
qualified as terroristic all acts committed for the purpose of “severly destabilising or
destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a
country or an international organisation (by means of) serious destruction of a
government or public installation, a transport system, an infrastructure, including an
information technology system, a platform attached to the continental shelf, a public
place or private premises with the risk of endangering human lives or causing substantial
economic losses […]”.
The current antiterrorist legislation, however, is not confined to forms of conduct directed against persons or infrastructures. It also involves types of behaviour that indirectly
contribute to the success of a terrorist action. In letter k) of its already mentioned “common position”, the Council of Europe brings within the compass of such conduct “the
supplying of information or material means or any other form of funding of activities (...)
that will be directed against the State or against other States”. This last was a new feature
introduced by the Terrorism Act of 2000, which also regards as terroristic an action directed against another State or a foreign institutions. Sect. 15 of a recent Italian Act, Law
No. 155 of 31 July 2005, which amended and converted into a law Legislative Order No.
144 of 27 July 2005 entitled “misure urgenti per il contrasto del terrorismo internazionale”, prescribes the insertion in the Criminal Code of sect. 270 quinquies relating to the
crime of training in activities directed to the ends of international terrorism. A crime
equally indictable when a terroristic action is directed against “a foreign State, an institution or international organisation”. The essential nature and importance of such a rule are
ROBERTO MAZZOLA
20
fully evident. Its absence, in fact, would transform the State into a sort of oasis of impunity for every kind of terrorist organisation24.
3.2 Question (b). On the nature of the relationship between subversion and
terrorism
Is there a difference between a terroristic and a subversive action? Is a terroristic
purpose implicit in a subversive purpose, and does a subversive purpose always imply
action of a terroristic kind?
Some commentators maintain that the concepts of subversion and terrorism are complementary and hence that their employment in the legislation is pleonastic. They are, in
fact, united insofar as their ends are identical: that of viewing political action as an organised manifestation of violence, and that of considering the employment of terroristic techniques indispensable for the purpose of subversion25. Even so, both the current opinions
of the jurists and the case law agree that they should be kept separate insofar as they are
used to indicate very dissimilar circumstances. “The term subversion, in fact, refers to the
entirety of the means of political struggle used to violently overthrow the constitutional
order, that is to say the set of principles and institutions on which a State is founded”26. In
this respect, attention may be directed to sect. 11 of Law No. 304 of 29 May 1982, where
it is laid down that subversion of the “democratic order” shall be deemed to comprise
every action whose purpose is to endanger the constitutional order, this being understood
as the set of fundamental principles established by the Constitution to define the structure
and functions of the State.
This, indeed, was the situation in Italy and Germany in the 1980s when the principal
aim of political terrorism was to subvert the democratic system27. It is, of course, true that
terrorism takes the form of indiscriminate attacks against governments, institutions and
international organisations. Even so, its most evident hallmark is its reiterated and systematic use of violent means against individual persons, groups and things to disseminate
terror and fear. The fact that subversion and terrorism are independent is the separation of
terrorism from subversion in sect. 4, first para. of Law No. 155 of 31 July 2005, which
deals with the strengthening of the information and security services. “In recent years, the
courts have been increasingly called upon to judge cases of crime in which, while a
criminal programme directed to the commission of acts of terrorism to the detriment of
24
Cf. C. Piemontese, Commento agli artt. 1, 2, 4 e 7 della l. 15 dicembre 2001, n. 45, in Leg. pen., 3
(2002), pp. 779-785.
25
A.A. Dalia, s.v. Kidnapping for the purpose of terrorism or subversion, in EdD, vol. XLII, Milan,
1990, p. 21.
26
M. Mazzani, La legge 6 febbraio 1980, n.15, in Giust. pen., 1980, III, p. 236.
27
Cf. O. Villoni, Il reato di associazione sovversiva con finalità di terrorismo internazionale e la nozione
di terrorismo negli strumenti e nelle convenzioni internazionali, in Giur. di merito. Rivista mensile di
Giurisprudenza dei giudici di merito, vol. XXXVII, 6 (2003), p. 1357.
RELIGION AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
21
foreign States was clearly present, there was a total absence of any intention to subvert
the domestic democratic order”28. Elimination of any lingering doubt concerning the distinction between subversion and terrorism, already deducible from sects. 280 and 289 bis
of the Italian Criminal Code, has now been secured by the new text of sect. 270 bis of the
Criminal Code, as enacted by Law No. 438 of 15 December 2001 entitled “Disposizioni
urgenti per contrastare al terrorismo internazionale”, as well as the case law of the High
Courts29 and the Court of Cassation30. Section 5 of Recommendation No. 1426 of the
Council of Europe (23 September 1999) entitled “European democracies in the face of
terrorism”, in fact, defines terrorism as “any offence committed by individuals or groups
that resort to violence or threaten violence against a country, its institutions, its population
in general or natural persons, who, motivated by separatist aspirations”.
3.3. Question (c). On the non-subversive nature of Islamic terrorism
While it is true that the subversive nature of an act can be deduced from its ability to
produce a real threat to the order of a State and the principles on which it is founded, examination of the propaganda of the jihadist Islamic organisations shows, as I have already
demonstrated, that the main aim of the jihad is not the West, but all the Muslim countries
that have betrayed the spirit of Islam. As indicated earlier, the strategic imperative of
salafita jihadista fundamentalism is to free the Arab-Muslim nations from those who
wish to separate the spiritual from the temporal. The fundamentalists are certain that the
“great battle […] which is indissociably moral and spiritual, if not indeed rebellious and
subversive, is a perpetual battle, an internal war of cleansing and at the same time a mystic, political and military experience that cannot underestimate the fact the greatest source
of danger for the Muslim community does not come from outside enemies, but from
within: from that fitna (disorder) which makes a Muslim the enemy of his fellow”31. This
emerges very clearly from the messages transmitted by the principal Islamic international
terrorist organisations32, which set out the essential features of the jihadist strategy,
namely: i) subversion of the 'apostate” regimes, starting with the Arabian peninsula; ii)
the struggle against the presence of American armed forces on Islamic soil and against
28
A. Palma, op. cit., p. 19.
As held by the Milan High Court, preliminary investigation, 24 January 2005, rapporteur Forleo, in
Giur.di merito. Rivista mensile di Giurisprudenza dei giudici di merito, vol. XXXVII, 4 (2005), p. 903. “la
nozione di terrorismo [...] diverge da quella di eversione e come questa non è definita in via normativa,
dovendosi dunque ricavare in via ermeneutica, sia sulla base del contenuto delle convenzioni internazionali
sul punto, sia, soprattutto, riflettendo sulla ratio e sulla genesi della norma penale in questione”.
30
Decisions of the Court of Cassation, Division VI, 1 July 2003, in Foro it., II, 2004, c. 217, and Division
VI, 13 October 2004, in Foro it., 2005, II, c. 218.
31
B. Etienne, op. cit, p. 157.
32
These messages have been published in the 3a Relazione sulla politica informativa e della sicurezza
(Primo semestre 2004) within the meaning of sect. 11, first para., of Law No. 801 of 24 October 1977, submitted by the Under-Secretary of State to the Prime Minister and forwarded to the President of the Republic
on 30 July 2004, in Camera dei Deputati, Atti Parlamentari, XIV legislatura, Doc. XXIII, n. 7.
29
ROBERTO MAZZOLA
22
the Jewish Crusade lobby and the nations allied with the United States and Israel33; iii) the
far-reaching jihad in Iraq against the occupying forces34.
4. JUSTICE VS. EMERGENCY. THOUGHTS ON THE INAPPROPRIATENESS OF AN
“EMERGENCY” POLICY IN THE HANDLING OF ISLAMIC TERRORISM
The facts set out above show that Islamic terrorism is not a danger to the constitutional
democracies.
The horror evoked by the pictures of pain caused by terrorist attacks must be allowed
to deceive institutions and decision makers. The values and the juridical goods threatened
as the result of Islamic terrorism are not such as to represent a threat to the constitutional
democratic system and its underlying values if they are lost35. The fact that they are
threatened, therefore, is not a sufficient reason for any recourse to a “state of emergency”
or “necessity” or, worse still, legislative policies inspired by such notions36. If, indeed, a
danger exists, this, as Lord Hoffman stated in his concurring opinion (no. 96) expressed
by the House of Lords with regard to the features of illegitimacy embodied in the AntiTerrorism Act 2001, lies in every law that unjustifiably abolishes or suspends the freedom
and fundamental rights of European citizens. Our best chance of securing a lasting victory
over terrorism lies in our “remaining firm in our defence of the values that terrorism seeks
to destroy”37. To give way on this issue would be to weaken the State based on the rule of
law. Serious and fearful as it may be, therefore, terrorist violence cannot be regarded as a
threat to the existence of Europe's democratic institutions, nor to the survival of the civil
33
“Minaccia terroristica. Documentazione di interesse. Terrorismo islamico internazionale”. Allegato
(italiano-inglese), in 53a Relazione sulla politica informativa e della sicurezza (Primo semestre 2004) within
the meaning of sect. 11, first para., of Law No. 801 of 24 October 1977, submitted by the Under-Secretary of
State to the Prime Minister and forwarded to the President of the Republic on 30 July 2004, op. cit., p. 91.
34
In Prime Minister's Office, Documentazione di interesse. Relazione sulla politica informativa e della
sicurezza, a cura della segretaria del CESIS: Allegato alla 55a Relazione sulla politica informativa e della
sicurezza (Primo semestre 2005) within the meaning of sect. 11, first para., of Law No. 801 of 24 October
1977, submitted by the Under-Secretary of State to the Prime Minister and forwarded to the President of the
Republic on 3 August 2005, p. 198.
35
In 53a Relazione sulla politica informativa e della sicurezza (Primo semestre 2004) within the meaning
of sect. 11, first para., of Law No. 801 of 24 October 1977, submitted by the Under-Secretary of State to the
Prime Minister and forwarded to the President of the Republic on 30 July 2004, op t., p. 87. See also the
Communiqué signed by the Brigades of Abu Hafs al Masri and sent by email to the London office of the
Arabic language newspaper Al Quds al Arabi on 12 April 2004, in Minaccia terroristica Documentazione di
interesse. Terrorismo islamico internazionaleö. 53a Relazione sulla politica informativa e della sicurezza
(Primo semestre 2004) within the meaning of sect. 11, first para., of Law No. 801 of 24 October 1977,
submitted by the Under-Secretary of State to the Prime Minister and forwarded to the President of the
Republic on 30 July 2004, op t., pp. 102-103.
36
Cf. G. De Vergottini, La difficile convivenza fra libertà e sicurezza: la risposta delle democrazie al
terrorismo, in Rass. par., (2004), p. 439.
37
W. Schwimmer, Prefazione a “Combattere il terrorismo. Norme e proposte del Consiglio d'Europa”,
op. cit., p. 10. See also T.E. Frosini-C. Bassu, La libertà personale nell'emergenza costituzionale, in
Democrazie protette e protezioni della democrazia, A. Di Giovine (ed. with introduction), Turin,
Giappichelli, 2005, p. 75.
RELIGION AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
23
community. One must guard against attempts to maintain and augment fear artificially so
that society must be permanently mobilised. There is a risk of wasting energy, skills and
expenditures on false objectives.
Rejection of the premises for a state of emergency, however, is not to underestimate
terrorism, but confine it to its true proportions. Jihadist Islamic fundamentalism in
Europe is undoubtedly a serious problem of domestic and international public order.
Effective political and strategic solutions are required. Even so, there is no need to stoop
to the introduction of special provisions that set aside the rule of law.
Public order and security in Europe today is a question of the choice of rules, government strategies and political approaches that must be first of all be “just” and secondly
“credible” and “practicable” in order to secure the maximum consensus from the community. They must also possess the minimum degree of flexibility needed to attain a fair
balancing of values38.
The unwavering intransigence that institutions must display against the odious forms
of violence associated with terrorist attacks must be accompanied by an equally firsl
awareness of the fact that today a policy of security must also provide solutions wherein
both juridical and ethical rules can live side by side. It cannot be denied that poor security
renders democratic orders more vulnerable and weakens their fundamental rights. The
right to security39, indeed, involves the entire political community40.
In the absence of security41, as stated in art. 6 of the Nice Charter and art. II-66 of the
Treaty adopting a Constitution for Europe42, there can be no full and effective freedom.
The opposite, however, is equally true. Any security policy that fails to respect freedoms
and equality is illegitimate43. Reasons of national security, in fact, cannot allow endangerment or, even less, justify the sacrifice of human rights, nor do they have the power to
38
Cf. S. Rodotà, Ordine pubblico o buon costume?, in Giurisprudenza di merito, 1970, p. 107.
Cf.